The Evolution of the State and the Failure of Society: Theoretical Notes

The article presents a theoretical and historical analysis of the state transformation processes, starting from the household patriarchal form of paternalism up to its later transfer to the state, creating the basis for “paternalistic state”, which differs from the patriarchal model by the collective nature of generating public interests and democratization possibilities of the public choice process itself. In this context the problems of democratization of non-market decisions, with their inherent risks of distortion of public choice, are considered, and the fundamental contradiction of the modern political process is formulated. As one of its consequences, the article draws a fundamental conclusion about the exhaustion of the “welfare state” model and the onset of the next stage of evolution, the feature of which is the transformation of the welfare state into a paternalistic state. This conclusion is combined with other results of this study, which highlighted the main stages of state evolution, including the initial phase of the “patriarchal state” and the stage of the “decline of the paternalistic state”, associated with the “failure of society”. The matter here is such a state, when the society's broken protective mechanisms no longer prevent the choice of paternalistic state goals that do not correspond to the interests of society, and the erroneous strategies of their implementation. The article formulates an assumption about the possibility of restoring society's “immune system”. Having reached the stage of a developed paternalistic state, society faces zevolutionary cross-roads. In one case, the process of paternalistic state degradation starts, accompanied by a reduction of the field of social choice and a transition to autocracy, and then to the liquidation of the mechanisms of social choice. In another case, there are prerequisites for recovery of society's immune system connected with the development of social networks, creating an essentially new channel of communication between politicians and society that contributes to the formation of informal institutions, providing expansion of the public choice field.

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