Institutional Dilemma of Modern Russia
Abstract
The article attempts to answer the question of what socioeconomic system is causing in the depths of evolution, and explain, why the contractual model provides the conditions for entering a new economic development stage. The conceptual basis of this is the synthesis of the author's razdatok theory with modern institutional concepts. The result of the rethinking of institutional evolution was the conclusion that the confrontation between market and razdatok (non-market, distributive) economies is replaced on integration of market and razdatok institutions in the 21st century. Therefore, the institutional dilemma is not a plan or a market, and not socialism or capitalism, but a quasi–market or contractual razdatok. Outwardly, both models look similar – resources are distributed through state orders on a competitive basis and contracts are concluded with legal guarantees. However, the quasi-market is based on the extractive synthesis, and protects the monopoly acquisition of public rent by a narrow group of individuals. Whereas the model of contractual razdatok, being a result from inclusive synthesis and the mechanism for the functioning of a social state, ensures the effective inclusion of all social groups in the process of economic development.
About the Author
Olga E. Bessonova
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Novosibirsk
Russian Federation
SB RAS
Russian Federation
SB RAS
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Review
For citations:
Bessonova O.E. Institutional Dilemma of Modern Russia. Economics of Contemporary Russia. 2018;(4):23-36. (In Russ.)
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