Behavior of the enterprise in the models of the theory of firm. Part 1

In the article the firm is considered as: a) the aggregate of individuals who have concluded contracts with the employer; b) an independent economic entity; c) the element of the national economy complex. Within the framework of these three approaches to the essence of a firm, the object of research is the behavior of the firm as a producing system, as a subject of management and the institution of society. The article consists of two parts. In the first part of the article the firm is considered as a production facility, in connection with which a brief description of the basic theories of the firm reflecting the influence of intra-production factors on the behavior of the enterprise is given. The approaches connected with agent-oriented modeling, variants of the neoclassical theory, J. Forrester's theory of industrial dynamics are disclosed. The agent-oriented approach makes it possible to link the actions of agents-individual participants in the economic activities of an enterprise-into a single whole. The expanded application of agent-based modeling also allows reflecting the influence on the firm of decisions taken by individuals outside the personal of employees or owners of the firm. The neoclassical approach is based on the notion of the firm as an independent, purposeful system that pursues the goal of maximizing a fixed criterion of optimality (rationality) of behavior. Such a criterion may reflect the interests of owners, managers or employees of the firm. A certain combination of similar criteria is also possible. The principle of optimality is often criticized, but it gives an opportunity, firstly, to describe the results of various processes within the enterprise in the most capacious form and, secondly, to ensure the study of the enterprise as a holistic economic phenomenon. For neoclassical models, the assumption of complete awareness and perfect rationality of persons making decisions concerning the behavior of an enterprise is characteristic. The main task of J. Forrester's theory is the analysis of the influence of the dynamic characteristics of the processes and structure of the enterprise on the results of its production activity. Management in the model is represented as a process associated with the formation and transformation of material and information flows.

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