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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecr-journal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая наука современной России</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economics of Contemporary Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1609-1442</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2618-8996</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.33293/1609-1442-2023-1(100)-33-47</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecr-journal-871</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Эволюция государства и провал общества: теоретические заметки</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Evolution of the State and the Failure of Society: Theoretical Notes</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Рубинштейн</surname><given-names>Александр Яковлевич</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Rubinstein</surname><given-names>Alexander Ya.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Заслуженный деятель науки РФ, кандидат экономических наук, доктор философских наук, профессор, руководитель научного направления «Теоретическая экономика»</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">arubin@aha.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт экономики РАН, Москва</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>01</day><month>04</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>33</fpage><lpage>47</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Рубинштейн А.Я., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Рубинштейн А.Я.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Rubinstein A.Y.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/article/view/871">https://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/article/view/871</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье представлен теоретико-исторический анализ процессов трансформации государства, начиная от домохозяйственной патриархальной формы патернализма до ее более позднего переноса на государство, создавшего основу «патерналистского государства», отличающегося от патриархальной модели коллективным характером генерирования общественных интересов и возможностями демократизации самого процесса общественного выбора. В этом контексте рассмотрены проблемы демократизации нерыночных решений с присущими им рисками искажения общественного выбора и сформулировано противоречие политического процесса. В качестве одного из его следствий в статье сделан принципиальный вывод об исчерпании модели «благотворящего государства» и наступлении очередного этапа эволюции, особенностью которого является перерастание государства благосостояния в патерналистское государство. Данный вывод соседствует с другими результатами этого исследования, позволившими выделить основные этапы эволюции государства, включая начальную фазу «патриархального государства» и стадию «заката патерналистского государства», связанную с «провалом общества». Речь идет о такой ситуации, когда нарушенные защитные механизмы социума перестали препятствовать выбору целей государства, не соответствующих интересам общества, и ошибочных стратегий их реализации. В статье сформулировано предположение относительно возможностей восстановления «иммунной системы» социума. По достижении стадии развитого патерналистского государства перед обществом появляется эволюционная развилка. В одном случае запускается процесс деградации патерналистского государства, сопровождающийся сокращением поля общественного выбора и переходом к автократии, а затем и к ликвидации механизмов общественного выбора. В другом случае появляются предпосылки восстановления иммунной системы социума, которые связаны с развитием социальных сетей, создающих принципиально новый канал коммуникации политиков и общества, способствующий формированию неформальных институтов, обеспечивающих расширение поля общественного выбора.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article presents a theoretical and historical analysis of the state transformation processes, starting from the household patriarchal form of paternalism up to its later transfer to the state, creating the basis for “paternalistic state”, which differs from the patriarchal model by the collective nature of generating public interests and democratization possibilities of the public choice process itself. In this context the problems of democratization of non-market decisions, with their inherent risks of distortion of public choice, are considered, and the fundamental contradiction of the modern political process is formulated. As one of its consequences, the article draws a fundamental conclusion about the exhaustion of the “welfare state” model and the onset of the next stage of evolution, the feature of which is the transformation of the welfare state into a paternalistic state. This conclusion is combined with other results of this study, which highlighted the main stages of state evolution, including the initial phase of the “patriarchal state” and the stage of the “decline of the paternalistic state”, associated with the “failure of society”. The matter here is such a state, when the society's broken protective mechanisms no longer prevent the choice of paternalistic state goals that do not correspond to the interests of society, and the erroneous strategies of their implementation. The article formulates an assumption about the possibility of restoring society's “immune system”. Having reached the stage of a developed paternalistic state, society faces zevolutionary cross-roads. In one case, the process of paternalistic state degradation starts, accompanied by a reduction of the field of social choice and a transition to autocracy, and then to the liquidation of the mechanisms of social choice. In another case, there are prerequisites for recovery of society's immune system connected with the development of social networks, creating an essentially new channel of communication between politicians and society that contributes to the formation of informal institutions, providing expansion of the public choice field.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>государство</kwd><kwd>общество</kwd><kwd>патернализм</kwd><kwd>общественный выбор</kwd><kwd>провал общества</kwd><kwd>защитные механизмы</kwd><kwd>гражданское общество</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>patriarchal paternalism</kwd><kwd>paternalistic state</kwd><kwd>public choice</kwd><kwd>failure of state</kwd><kwd>paternalistic failure</kwd><kwd>failure of society</kwd><kwd>protective mechanisms</kwd><kwd>civil society</kwd><kwd>social networks</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Алмонд Г., Верба С. 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