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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ecr-journal</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Экономическая наука современной России</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Economics of Contemporary Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1609-1442</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2618-8996</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.33293/1609-1442-2020-4(91)-118-131</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ecr-journal-619</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННАЯ ПРАКТИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ECONOMICAL POLICY AND ECONOMICAL PRACTICE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Государственные закупки и качество оказываемых услуг: пример больниц города Москвы</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Public Procurement  and the Quality of Services: The Case of Moscow Hospitals</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5888-3817</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Кравцова</surname><given-names>Маргарита Владиславовна</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kravtsova</surname><given-names>Margarita  V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>советник</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">R-V-K-93@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Управление социальной политики Аналитического центра при Правительстве Российской Федерации, Москва</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Social Policy Department, Analytical Center of the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>31</day><month>12</month><year>2020</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>118</fpage><lpage>131</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Кравцова М.В., 2020</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2020</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Кравцова М.В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kravtsova M.V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/article/view/619">https://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/article/view/619</self-uri><abstract><p>Работа посвящена поиску ответа на вопрос: «Существуют ли различия в государственных закупках заказчиков, которые предоставляют услуги разного качества?». В статье обозначены стадии закупочного процесса больниц в контрактной системе и выделены основные стратегии заказчика, применяемые на торгах. Рассмотрены результаты независимой оценки качества оказания услуг и проведена сравнительная характеристика больниц с низким и высоким рейтингом качества. Проанализированы потребности больниц по видам закупок и их ежегодные объемы контрактов. Определены преимущества конкурентных процедур и выделены ключевые факторы, влияющие на уровень конкуренции, с возможными рисками ненадежного исполнения контрактов. Эмпирическое исследование основывается на базе данных, которая содержит 5390 контрактов двух больниц города Москвы за 2011–2018 гг. Используя методы эконометрического анализа, в частности метод наименьших квадратов и разницу в средних, в работе проверяется гипотеза о том, что высокая конкуренция положительно влияет на качество оказания медицинских услуг. Построенные регрессионные модели показывают, что заказчик, оказывающий услуги высокого качества, имеет низкую конкуренцию и небольшие скидки на торгах. Выявлено, что имеется больший срок исполнения контактов, задержки в поставках товаров и услуг по сравнению с заказчиком, оказывающим услуги низкого качества. Таким образом, было определено, что занижение конкуренции на торгах свидетельствует о желании больницы гарантировать более высокое качество предоставления медицинских услуг пациентам, в то время как агрессивные ставки участников приводят к поставке некачественных закупок. Результаты исследования могут быть полезны уполномоченным органам при разработке нормативно-правовых актов для участников контрактной системы в сфере закупок здравоохранения.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The work is devoted to the search for answers to the question: “Are there any differences in the public procurement of customers who provide services of different quality?”. The article identifies the stages of the hospital procurement process in the contract system and highlights the main customer strategies used in the auction. The results of an independent quality assessment are examined and comparative hospital characteristics with low and high quality rating are conducted. The hospital needs according to the types of purchases and their annual volumes of contracts are analyzed. The advantages of competitive procedures are determined and the key factors affecting the level of competition with possible risks of unreliable execution of contracts are identified. The empirical study is based on the database which includes 5390 contracts of 2 hospitals in Moscow for years of 2011–2017. Using the methods of econometric analysis, in particular, the method of least squares and the difference in the average, the hypothesis is tested the high competition has a positive effect on the quality of medical services. The constructed regression models show that the customer providing high quality services has low competition and small rebates at the auction. At the same time there are more contract terms, delays in the supply of goods and services as compared with the customer providing low quality services. Thus it was found that the underestimation of competition at the auction indicates the desire of the hospital to guarantee a higher quality of medical services to patients while as aggressive bids of participants lead to the supply of poor purchases. The results of the study may be useful for the competent authorities in the development of legal acts for the participants of the contract system in the field of health procurement.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>государственные закупки</kwd><kwd>заказчик</kwd><kwd>поставщик</kwd><kwd>конкуренция</kwd><kwd>качество услуг</kwd><kwd>больница</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>public procurement</kwd><kwd>customer</kwd><kwd>supplier</kwd><kwd>competition</kwd><kwd>quality of services</kwd><kwd>hospital</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="ru">Благодарность кандидату экономических наук, доценту факультета экономических наук НИУ ВШЭ Подколзиной Елене Анатольевне за помощь при проведении данного исследования.</funding-statement><funding-statement xml:lang="en">The author is grateful to Cand. Sc. 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