ecr-journalЭкономическая наука современной РоссииEconomics of Contemporary Russia1609-14422618-8996Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences10.33293/1609-1442-2026-29(3)-35-46YYZGQNecr-journal-1189Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННАЯ ПРАКТИКАECONOMICAL POLICY AND ECONOMICAL PRACTICEПоведенческие аспекты принятия решений в условиях централизованного государственного ценообразования в строительствеBehavioral aspects of decisionmaking under centrally planned state pricing in constructionhttps://orcid.org/0009-0005-5283-6760ФирсовДмитрий АлександровичFirsovDmitriy A.

доктор экономических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник

Dr. Sci. (Economics), Leading Researcher

firsov_d@mail.ruhttps://orcid.org/0009-0002-9838-8156ЕвстафьеваИрина ЮрьевнаEvstafyevaIrina Yu.

кандидат экономических наук, доцент, старший научный сотрудник

Cand. Sc. (Economics), Associate Professor, Senior Researcher

iue72@yandex.ruЦЭМИ РАН, МоскваРоссияCentral Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, MoscowRussian Federation2026051020262933546Copyright © Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 20262026Regional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of SciencesRegional Public Organization for Assistance to the Development of Institutions of the Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Scienceshttps://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://www.ecr-journal.ru/jour/article/view/1189

Предметом исследования настоящей статьи выступают экономические отношения субъектов инвестиционной деятельности, сформировавшиеся в ходе реализации инвестиционных проектов, финансируемых государством. Объектами исследования являются представители подрядных организаций, входящие в состав субъектов таких отношений, с одной стороны, имеющие возможность извлечения сверхприбыли путем необоснованного обогащения, с другой — ​рискующие потерять бизнес ввиду отсутствия стабильности заказов в конкурентной борьбе с другими участниками государственных закупок, не всегда добросовестной. Гипотеза системного исследования данного противоречия определяет, что ключевое условие для необоснованного обогащения бенефициаров подрядных организаций — ​перманентный разрыв между государственными расценками и рыночными ценами на строительно-­монтажные работы. Исследование позволило выявить самодостаточные и взаимосвязанные факторы, создающие проблемы ценообразования: информационная асимметрия на рынке инвестиционных товаров в сегменте государственных закупок и парадоксальное поведение экономических агентов в условиях попыток сделать процессы ценообразования прозрачными. В результате эксперимента выявлено, что унификация ценовых параметров и повышение их открытости не поддерживаются подрядными организациями. Стандартные экономические модели, предполагающие, что рациональные субъекты максимизируют полезность и реагируют на экономические стимулы, не объясняют это явление. Подрядчики сообщают, что прозрачное ценообразование снизит их прибыльность, но одновременно проявляют интерес к рыночному регулированию. И это противоречие свидетельствует о том, что их решениями движут психологические механизмы, а не экономическая рациональность. Цель данного исследования заключается в формировании научно обоснованных предложений по совершенствованию системы ценообразования на рынке инвестиционных товаров, учитывающих психологические аспекты рационального поведения экономических агентов. Исследование имеет прикладное значение для разработки и внедрения цифровых инструментов в целях повышения прозрачности на рынке. Область применения исследования — ​государственная инвестиционная политика.

The subject of this article is the economic relations of investment activity subjects that have been formed during the implementation of state-­funded investment projects. The objects of research are representatives of contracting organizations that are part of the subjects of such relations, on the one hand, who have the opportunity to extract super profits through unjustified enrichment, and on the other hand, who risk losing their business due to the lack of stability of orders in the process of competing with other participants in public procurement, which is not always fair. The hypothesis of a systematic study of this contradiction determines that the key condition for the unjustified enrichment of the beneficiaries of contracting organizations is the permanent gap between government rates and market prices for construction and installation work. The study revealed two, on the one hand, self-sufficient, on the other hand, interrelated factors that generate pricing problems: information asymmetry in the market of investment goods in the public procurement segment and the paradoxical behavior of economic agents in the context of attempts to make pricing processes transparent. As a result of the experiment, it was revealed that the unification of price parameters and increasing their openness are not supported by contractors. Standard economic models that assume that rational actors maximize utility and respond to economic incentives do not explain this phenomenon. At the same time, contractors report that transparent pricing will reduce their profitability, but they are interested in “market regulation,” and this contradiction indicates that psychological mechanisms, rather than economic rationality, drive their decisions. The purpose of this study is to form scientifically sound proposals for improving the pricing system in the market of investment goods, taking into account the psychological aspects of the rational behavior of economic agents. The research is of applied importance for the development and implementation of digital tools in order to increase transparency in the market. The scope of the research is the state investment policy.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.